Sticky situation : some prices are slow to change. Are they sticky enough to affect monetary policy? by Doug Campbell
E
ven if you’re not familiar
with the term “sticky
prices,” you encounter
them all the time. How many years
has your newspaper sold for 50 cents 
a copy? No matter if interest rates 
are moving up or down, the price of
your newspaper hardly ever changes
— it’s sticky.
Economists take for granted that
some prices are rigid, slow to shift
even as supply and demand condi-
tions might seem to warrant. For
many economists, these “nominal
frictions” are enormously important,
a core reason why monetary policy
matters.
For other economists, however,
sticky prices are neither widespread
nor meaningful in the slightest for
public policy.
Differences of opinion are hum-
drum stuff in economic circles. But
on the issue of sticky prices, the level
of disagreement is sharp and raises
some exceptionally high stakes.
Economists build mathematical 
models that are supposed to help 
policymakers decide when and how
much to change interest rates. In
recent years, sticky-price models have
gained currency and are being used 
to inform Fed decisionmakers in 
setting interest rates.
But if sticky prices don’t really
matter for monetary policy, as some
prominent economists theorize, then
what use are sticky-price models to
the Federal Reserve System?
More to the point: If sticky prices
don’t matter, does the Fed?
The behind-the-scenes debate
about the importance of sticky prices
is going on at the uppermost levels of
economic thinking. Ben Bernanke, a
Fed governor on leave from Princeton
University’s economics department,
referred optimistically to the evolu-
tion of sticky-price models in a 2004
speech: “The insights from these
types of modeling efforts are already
informing policy analysis at the
Board, and their influence will only
grow as they become more detailed
and realistic.”
But where Bernanke sees promise
in sticky-price models, others see
inescapable flaws. Patrick Kehoe,
monetary adviser at the Minneapolis
Fed — whose president, Gary Stern,
is a voting member in 2005 on the
Federal Open Market Committee —
suggests that economists ditch fur-
ther research on sticky-price models.
“No one has really yet made a con-
vincing quantitative case for them,”
he says.
It is difficult to predict when, if
ever, a resolution will happen. But
how the sticky-price debate is settled
may have significant implications for
public policy.
ASticky-Price Illustration
At the supermarket, the price of a box
of brand-name cornflakes seldom
fluctuates. For months it may be
$2.49, perhaps going on sale for $1.99.
As long as it stays at within those 
two bounds, the price of cornflakes is 
considered sticky.
Intuitively, you might expect more
frequent price changes for a box of
cornflakes. Say it was a bumper crop
year for corn — shouldn’t the price 
of cornflakes then fall because of the
increased supply? But for microeco-
nomic reasons they don’t budge. Firms
must weigh factors like “menu costs”
— literally, the cost of setting new
prices as on a restaurant menu — and
the psychological impact on customers
who are accustomed to the old price.
Simply put, prices tend to change only
when it’s financially advantageous for
the producer to do so. Similar reason-
ing can be applied to changes in work-
ers’ wages.
The fact that prices don’t continu-
ously move is believed by many 
economists to be the key insight into
how monetary policy can affect the
economy. It is an underlying justifi-
cation for so-called “monetary non-
neutrality” — that is, why money 
matters. This is in contrast to “monetary
neutrality,” which posits that an increase
in the money supply would simply be
offset by rises in prices and wages.
When the Fed sets policy for the 
federal funds rate, it is influencing 
the growth of the money supply. If 
prices weren’t sticky, and in the
absence of other frictions, then theo-
retically the Fed’s actions wouldn’t
matter for economic output. Put
another way, if there’s more money
available with no change in prices,
then consumers theoretically will buy
more cornflakes. Cornflakes seem
cheaper in this scenario. Conversely,
if there’s less money in circulation,
shoppers will dial down their corn-
flake purchases since their price now
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ior has the potential to affect the real
economy.
The degree to which some econo-
mists believe prices are sticky tends
to shape their beliefs on monetary
policy. Sticky-price fans tend to be
more optimistic about the potential
importance of monetary policy, while
sticky-price disbelievers often view
monetary policy choices as relatively
unimportant. At the same time, both
sides are inclined to agree that price
stability is the most desirable out-
come of monetary policy — and gen-
erally don’t subscribe to the old
Keynesian notion that the central
bank should use monetary policy to
try to fine-tune the economy. It’s 
just that sticky-price believers view
monetary policy as effective because
of the existence of sticky prices; the
skeptics see monetary policy’s powers
as more wrapped up in how successful
the central bank is at communicating
its intentions and not surprising the
market with wild fluctuations in
interest rates. 
Today, macroeconomists rely on
intricate economic models to examine
the impact of the money supply on
the real economy. Those models in
turn inform policy deliberations of
the Federal Open Market Committee.
There now exist two main schools of
thought: one that thinks sticky prices
matter and any modeling that doesn’t
use them will produce misleading
results; the other that sticky prices
don’t matter and that standard real-
business-cycle models work just fine,
thank you very much.
These camps are neatly encapsu-
lated in the views of two leading econ-
omists: Jordi Galí and the aforemen-
tioned Patrick Kehoe. In between is
Alex Wolman, an economist with the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
whose sticky-price research is widely
cited.
The Believer
Galí is a professor at the Universitat
Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, Spain,
who has concentrated on monetary
policy and the business cycle. He is a
passionate believer that sticky prices
play an important role in explaining
how monetary policy works.
“Not only do they matter but they
are probably the single most impor-
tant reason why monetary policy
plays such a central role in modern
economics,” Galí says. “In the absence
of nominal frictions, monetary policy
would be largely irrelevant and infla-
tion and its costs a secondary concern
at most.” With that theoretical under-
pinning, Galí  is forging ahead with
research on the interaction between
sticky prices and monetary policy
rules.
Much of his work seems to
debunk long-held views about how
the business cycle works. For example,
Galí and two co-authors argued in 
a recent paper that it’s because of
sticky prices that increased govern-
ment spending may actually raise
consumption among forward-thinking
consumers.
This is in contrast with the 
prediction of standard “neoclassical”
economic models, which suggest that
such expenditures may not have this
effect because individuals are fore-
sighted and recognize that a govern-
ment that increases spending today
will likely have to decrease spending 
or raise taxes in the future; as a result,
those consumers do not necessarily
alter their consumption patterns.
While Galí and his neoclassical 
colleagues may disagree over the
empirical effects of increased govern-
ment spending, both sides caution
that economic analysis alone cannot
determine whether such spending is
desirable. 
The Skeptic
Over at the Minneapolis Fed, Patrick
Kehoe is doubtful. In reviewing the
past two decades’ work on sticky-price
models, Kehoe sees rampant shortcom-
ings. No work, he says, has succeeded in
replicating output blips like those seen
during the Great Depression. “Most
people who play the sticky price game
don’t try to account for episodes in the
data,” Kehoe says. “The way the mone-
tary literature has gone recently, they 
seldom ask serious questions like that.”
As ammunition, Kehoe points to
some recent research on just how 
un-stickyprices in the U.S. market really
are. In 2002, Mark Bils of the Uni-
versity of Rochester and Peter Klenow
of Stanford University first reported
findings from their look into a new
trove of data: previously unpublished
information on individual consumer
prices collected by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. In aggregate, those
data make up the consumer price
index, compiled by government
employees who literally observe prices
of hundreds of individual products,
from groceries to magazines, store by
store. Bils and Klenow got special per-
mission to review the micro-data on
prices and concluded that these prices
actually change quite frequently, on
average about every four months. That
doesn’t seem so sticky, Kehoe argues.
Additionally, Kehoe cites new research
suggesting that when prices change,
they do so in big chunks, much bigger
than relative to what you’d expect
based just on money shocks.
Thus to Kehoe, much of the work
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Unable to produce results that match
actual economic data, sticky-price
enthusiasts are reduced to weakly argu-
ing that their models can account for
what happens after a monetary shock
while admitting that monetary policy,
broadly defined, accounts for only a
tiny fraction of the business cycle,
Kehoe says. “If that’s true, then why are
we looking at it in the first place?” he
asks with exasperation in his voice.
Galí counters the criticism that
sticky-price models don’t explain
periods like the Great Depression by
referring to new variations of sticky-
price models that have been enriched
with features like habit formation
and capital adjustment costs. In these
models, “It is much easier to generate
persistent output fluctuations, even
in response to monetary policy
shocks,” he says. Equally, Galí argues
that just because he believes in the
power of sticky prices doesn’t mean
he thinks they’re the only important
factor in the economy. “The fact that
nominal rigidities play an important
role in the economy does not neces-
sarily imply that monetary policy
shocks should be an important source
of fluctuations; there are other
shocks in the economy.”
The Moderate
On the matter of sticky prices, the
Richmond Fed’s Alex Wolman is some-
thing of an agnostic. Wolman got in on
the ground floor of modern sticky-
price modeling through his serendipi-
tous association with Robert King,
then a professor at the University of
Virginia, where Wolman was a Ph.D.
student. King — now at Boston
University and a consultant to the
Richmond Fed — was at the forefront
of incorporating sticky prices into
equilibrium business cycle models.
Since the 1990s, Wolman has
worked with both so-called “state-
dependent” and “time-dependent”
sticky-price models. In state-depend-
ent models, firms essentially are pre-
sented with an economic choice
about whether it’s a good time or bad
time to switch prices, and the sole
criterion for making that decision is
whether it will cost more to the firm
to keep prices stable than to incur a
menu-type cost to change them. By
contrast, in “time-dependent” models,
prices are automatically changed or
not after a certain period. 
Wolman argues that state-depend-
ent models are superior to time-
dependent versions because they more
accurately mirror the real economy.
They don’t impose so much structure
on firms as they allow them to decide
when to adjust prices based on envi-
ronmental conditions — whether it’s
cheaper to leave prices unchanged or
not. But the trade-off is that state-
dependent models are more technical-
ly involved, so on occasion Wolman
prefers to work with time-dependent
models. Among other things, Wolman
has used time-dependent sticky-price
models to argue that the Fed isn’t pow-
erless when nominal interest rates
reach zero.
Wolman continues his research
with sticky-price models. He is trying
to both understand them better —
especially their implications for mon-
etary policy — and to advance them.
As widely used as sticky-price models
are today, they still aren’t all that well
understood, he says. 
Long-term, where Wolman sees
the most promise is where Kehoe
sees the most problems. The same
Bils and Klenow data that showed
shorter periods of time between
price changes
also show 
enormous variance, or “heterogene-
ity.” Wolman thinks sticky-price
models can begin to incorporate the
vast differences in how firms change
prices — something that nobody has
really accomplished yet. “It’s not
straightforward to write down and
solve models with those features,” 
he says. “What we need to under-
stand is how that heterogeneity in
the frequency of price adjustment
matters.” The upshot, Wolman
hopes, will be a model that produces
results more consistent with actual
economic data.
Building such a model is impor-
tant because it will help us get at the
central issue of this debate: the
extent to which monetary policy and
the Fed matter in the real world.
The irony that a monetary skeptic
is serving as monetary adviser at a
Federal Reserve bank is not lost on
Kehoe. But he doesn’t necessarily see
it as a conflict. To be sure, there is
evidence that monetary policy run
amok can severely damage an econo-
my — witness runaway U.S. inflation
in the late 1970s, a phenomenon
many economists including Kehoe
attribute to the Fed’s poor handling
of the money supply. 
At the same time, Kehoe thinks
the reverence with which the U.S.
Federal Reserve System is held by
some may be overstated. The Fed 
cannot hope to smooth every blip in
the economy with monetary policy, 
he says, because it doesn’t really 
wield that kind of power. The per-
ceived failure of sticky-price models is
case in point for Kehoe. “I could well
imagine that monetary policy is
important in a variety of ways, but I
don’t think that the profession in
general and sticky-price enthusi-
asts in particular have a handle on
the mechanism by which it is,” he
says. “I’m perfectly comfortable
working at the Fed without thinking
that the Fed can save the day for every
recession and at the same time think
it’s important to keep prices stable.”
Perhaps surprisingly, sticky-price
enthusiast Galí somewhat shares
that sentiment: “The presence of
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“We as economists
don’t know exactly
how what the Fed
does matters for the
real economy.” 
Region Focus Spring 2005 v.6.ps - 4/25/2005 13:12 PMSpring 2005 • Region Focus 23
high and persistent levels of un-
employment in many industrial
economies can hardly be attributed
to nominal rigidities. At most, 
monetary policy can provide a 
temporary patch.”
In other words: Monetary policy
is not the cure-all salve for the econ-
omy that the popular media have
lately told you about. Both Kehoe
and Galí agree that it’s good for some
things, but not all things — though
Galí is more enthusiastic about it
than Kehoe.
Their differences are nuanced but
important. With regard to monetary
policy, Kehoe is content to shoot for
general price stability and then let the
real economy work out other kinks
on its own. Gali, by contrast, draws a
strong connection between the exis-
tence of sticky prices and the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy. Because
of this, he has greater confidence 
in monetary policy’s ability to guide
the behavior of the real economy.
Wolman isn’t at all ready to give
up on sticky-price modeling, but he
think a lot more work remains: 
“I believe what the Fed does matters.
But we as economists don’t know
exactly how what the Fed does 
matters for the real economy.”
He pauses. “It’s slow going for
people to reach a definitive conclu-
sion about the effects of Fed behav-
ior on the real economy. Hopefully,
by gathering more data and building
more models, we can become better
informed about this question.” RF
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